Often presented as a pre-requisite for democratization, autocrats often weaponize constitutions and legal provisions for their political gains. My research seeks to understand better the conditions under which autocrats decide to rely on a specific institution to remain in power and the implications of these institutional reforms on regime stability.
The Politics of Legislative Expansion (with Nicolas van de Walle)
Abstract: The number of seats in national legislatures around the world rarely changes, Yet, in Africa, a substantial number of countries have regularly increased the number of seats, and these increases have become more common in recent years. Previous research on political offices in Africa’s electoral autocracies has suggested that their numbers and increases are motivated in large part by patronage and clientelist considerations. Is this also the case for national legislatures? Curiously, there is virtually no political science scholarship on legislature size, either in Africa or in the rest of the world. Using a mixture of descriptive statistics to present a new data base, as well as econometrics and three case studies, we find that legislative expansion can be causally linked to executive branch manipulation. Presidents have found it politically useful to expand the size of African legislatures and add a second chamber in order to weaken the legislature and/or to control it.
A Two-Headed Monster: Bicameralism in African Autocracies
Abstract: Since the 1990s and its third wave of democratization, 36% African states became bicameral. This sudden trend is puzzling for two reasons. First, bicameral legislatures have been decreased by 33% . Second, although upper houses often aim to improve democratic representation, descriptive statistics show that those second chambers were mostly created in electoral autocracies. Hence, what does explain this resurgence of African senates? Why do autocrats take the risk to create an institution that could reinforce the legislature and the state of democracy? This paper makes two claims. This paper makes two claims. First, I argue that only strong autocrats have the capacity to introduce an upper house in the political system. Second, and related to my first point, autocrats will only create another chamber if it improves autocratic stability. To assess my argument systematically, I provide descriptive statistics from original data and adopt a mix-method empirical strategy.
Institutional Trust in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission
Abstract: Some evidence suggests that electoral commissions enjoy a high degree of trust among the public, even in autocratic settings where they are widely seen by experts as tools of the ruling regime. With Zimbabwe being one of the most authoritarian regimes of the region, one could expect the Zimbabweans to be wary of their electoral commissions. Nevertheless, Afrobarometer surveys have shown the majority of respondents expressed their trust in the electoral commission. Hence one may wonder what does shape people’s attitudes towards electoral commissions in an authoritarian regime? Are institutions that are mere window dressing effective at increasing trust in the most autocratic settings, but a potential source of dissatisfaction under more competitive forms of authoritarianism?To solve this puzzle, I elaborate a micro-theory of institutional trust. I argue that individuals’ experiences with the electoral commission shape their attitude towards it. If individuals witness forms of electoral manipulation engineered by the executive branch, individuals will be less likely to trust the commission. To assess my arguments systematically, I use evidence from surveys of more than 4,800 respondents conducted in Zimbabwe by Afrobarometer in 2012 and 2014. I apply a generalized difference-in-difference framework to test whether voters who directly experienced electoral manipulation are more likely to distrust the electoral commission.
Autocratic Lawfare (with Siri Gloppen and Nic van de Walle)
Supreme Court Composition and Judicial Autonomy: the Effects of Colonial Institutions